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I.  The Changing Global Context 
Significant changes in the global setting over the course of 
the last few decades resulted in an increasing prominence for 
the pursuit of transnational justice and individual accountability. 
The aftermath of the terrifying attacks on America on September 
11
th seems likely to halt this trend, at least temporarily, but not 
necessarily. If winning this new war against terrorism is 
understood to depend on addressing its roots in deprivation and 
grievance, then the indirect effect of the attacks could be to 
strengthen awareness that the promotion of justice is integral to 
global security rather than a matter of generosity or empathy.   
Six developments in the global context have encouraged 
the pursuit of global justice, and provide a background for an 
appreciation of the institutional and substantive innovations that   3
have taken place in response: (1) the end of the ideological 
rivalry that accompanied the cold war; (2) the focus of attention 
on world economic policy within a market-oriented framework; 
(3) the relevance of international human rights standards to a 
series of peaceful transitions from authoritarian rule to 
constitutional democracy; (4) the heightened influence of 
transnational social forces and networks of activists in a wide 
array of normative (ethical, legal) arenas of decision; (5) the anti-
colonial movement as an implementation of the right of self-
determination; and (6) the geopolitics of ambivalence with 
respect to the conduct of humanitarian diplomacy either under 
the auspices of the UN or on some other basis. Each of these 
developments deserves some brief explanation.   
(1) End of cold war. The strategic rivalry between East and 
West tended to give an ideological edge to all discussions of 
normative issues, including human rights. Despite this 
atmosphere of tension and conflict in the realm of values and 
ideas, remarkable progress was made during the cold war in 
establishing an impressive foundation for human rights in   4
international law. The United Nations provided the auspices for 
this notable achievement, realized principally through the 
medium of a series of inter-governmental negotiated texts that 
evolved from legal documents encompassing human rights as a 
whole to a focus on such specific sectors of concern as racial 
discrimination, treatment of women and children, and the 
prohibition of torture.  
  Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, these 
developments were largely freed from polemical instruments of 
international propaganda, and failures of governments to respect 
fundamental human rights acted to erode the underpinnings of 
political legitimacy. A consensus emerged among states that 
legitimate governance at the national level depended upon 
constitutionalism, a robust private sector, and respect for human 
rights, including especially property rights and electoral 
procedures to determine political leadership. 
In this regard, it is important to take account of changes in 
the development approaches of countries in the South. With 
disappointments associated with foreign economic assistance,   5
the collapse of the leading socialist country, the impressive 
success of the East Asian market-oriented economies, and the 
failure of the 1970s movement for a New International Economic 
Order, there was a widespread abandonment by countries in the 
South of Marxist-oriented, and even distinctively “Third World” 
development perspectives. One expression of this new climate of 
opinion was a shift in emphasis by capital-importing countries 
from attempts to expropriate foreign owned properties to efforts 
to attract maximum private investment, which presupposed the 
stability of alien property rights, minimal regulation, low rates of 
taxation, and non-interference with the repatriation of profits. 
Obviously, the leading international financial institutions played 
a huge role in promoting this reorientation of national economic 
policies, including making the availability of capital and credit 
conducive to the establishment of conditions favorable to private 
investment. 
(2) An era of globalization. These factors associated with 
the disappearance of strategic rivalries, with their recurrent 
threats of major warfare, along with the shared preoccupation   6
around the world with the dynamics of rapid economic growth, 
led to a new phase of world politics, most widely labeled as 
“globalization.” The economistic emphases on growth, especially 
given the accompanying opposition to interferences with the 
efficient use of capital, created some of the discontents 
associated with emergent patterns of global economic 
governance. [For one depiction among many see Richard Falk, 
Predatory Globalization: A Critique (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1999)] 
Part of the enthusiasm for such an unabashed embrace of 
neo-liberal ideas by dominant forces around the world also 
resulted from a new attitude toward the relationship between 
conditions favoring economic success and preferred political 
arrangements. At least rhetorically, and to some extent 
behaviorally, there was a shift in leadership circles from the view 
that authoritarian rule, disciplining labor and protecting 
entrepreneural interests, was best for growth and investment to 
an endorsement of liberal models of democracy and respect for 
human rights. This shift mainly focused on the establishment of 
conditions allowing free, multi-party elections, and rights of   7
political opposition, but was also generally supportive of efforts 
at the international level to respect human rights, especially 
those of civil and political character. The establishment of an 
Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights within the UN 
System was an institutional response in 1993 to the growing role 
of human rights in international life. 
(3) Transitional Justice. A closely related development 
concerned the manner with which constitutional democracy 
emerged in various national settings that had been previously 
brutally governed in an authoritarian manner. This process of 
transition raised serious questions about the degree of scrutiny 
that should be directed at Crimes Against Humanity, torture, and 
other abuses of state power. On the side of maximal scrutiny 
were those who argued in favor of individual accountability for 
past crimes of state. On the side of minimal scrutiny were those 
who were either associated with or supportive of the former 
government or those who believed it was necessary to give up 
the quest for “justice” so as to sustain “peace.” This choice 
usually reflected pragmatic calculations, and especially the   8
realization that military and political forces from the old order 
retained varying degrees of influence within the armed forces, 
security and intelligence services, and other structures of power. 
The most common formula for compromise in this context was to 
opt for “truth” by establishing truth and reconciliation 
commission with varying mandates, whose members were 
respected for their integrity and professional competence. In 
exchange, efforts to pursue a strict accounting and retributive 
justice were renounced. The widespread adoption of such an 
approach, especially in Latin America, caused complaints about 
the emergence of a “culture of impunity.” In response, supporters 
of truth and reconciliation commissions in these circumstances 
argued that this was as far down the path of legality and 
deterrence that the political realities would allow. [For a series 
of valuable interpretations of the dynamics of transitional justice, 
see Robert I. Rotberg and Dennis Thompson, eds., Truth v. 
Justice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).] 
As earlier indicated, the change in the global setting of the 
1990s opened the way toward more ambitious approaches on   9
these matters. Later transnational efforts to establish special 
tribunals (former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Cambodia, and possibly 
Sierre Leone, East Timor) and the ICC gave rise to an impressive 
coalition of governments and NGOs seeking to push in the 
direction of accountability as an integral dimension of global 
governance. 
In this respect, the truth commission mechanism gathered 
material about the criminality of certain governments and their 
leader, and thereby expressed some concern that past misdeeds 
be repudiated, that victimization be acknowledged, and that the 
new political order provide reassurances about repetition. But 
such commissions also fell short, and exhibited the inability and 
unwillingness to impose accountability on those responsible for 
such abuses in the past, or in most instances, to identify even 
the main perpetrators. It is a matter of conjecture as to whether 
reconciliation can occur in the absence of some retributive 
mechanism that both punishes and takes away ill-gotten gains. 
Some anthropologists have argued that without this retributive 
dimension, the disclosures associated with "truth” do not protect   10
the society from a recurrence of violence, especially in setting 
where past abuses were associated with ethnic cleansing. [See 
John Borneman, “Reconciliation after Ethnic Cleansing: 
Listening, Retribution, Affiliation,” to be published in Public 
Culture, 2002; compare more delinked approaches favored in 
Rotberg & Thompson, note -, especially chapters of Alex Boraine 
and Dumisa B. Ntsebeza.]   
(4) Activist Networks. The unexpected impact of 
international human rights came about largely through the efforts 
of voluntary associations of citizens acting on the basis of 
transnational values and goals. Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch, particularly in relation to civil and political 
rights, developed extremely effective means to exert influence 
on governments. Linkages were established between these 
transnational NGOs, local activists, and individuals and groups 
that were the targets of governmental abuse. Information 
became an instrument of “soft power” as most governments 
were reluctant to have their image tarnished by the publication 
of objective reports that could not be dismissed as hostile   11
propaganda. [A useful assessment of this emergent transnational 
activism can be found in Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, 
Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International 
Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998) esp. 79-120; 
for a pioneering study of the emergence of global civil society 
see Mary Kaldor, Global Civil Society: A New Phenomenon 
(forthcoming 2002).] 
This activism in civil society also encouraged governments, 
especially those of a liberal democratic persuasion, to take 
human rights more seriously in the formation of their foreign 
policy. Western governments also realized that they enjoyed a 
definite advantage if compared to communist governments with 
regard to civil and political rights. As a result, Western 
governments tended to put human rights increasingly on their 
foreign policy agendas, and gave such issues prominence in 
East/West negotiations, perhaps most saliently in the Helsinki 
Accords of 1975. This agreement that stabilized the borders of 
Eastern Europe in exchange for an annual accounting of human 
rights adherence turned out to be historically relevant, both   12
discrediting oppressive regimes and mobilizing domestic 
opposition around the assertion of legitimate demands. In the 
1980s the peaceful transition of Eastern European countries 
(with the partial and notable exception of Romania) and of the 
Soviet Union was greatly facilitated by civic activism that rested 
on demands for patterns of governance that respected 
international human rights standards. 
Such activism also gave rise to the anti-apartheid 
movement, and especially led such governments as the United 
States and Great Britain to abandon their support of the South 
African government as a strategic ally in the cold war. This 
movement also involved the whole of the United Nations in an 
effort to exert pressure via sanctions on the racist regime in 
South Africa. The success of these pressures in producing a 
multi-racial democracy without accompanying bloodshed was 
one of the political miracles of the 1990s, and demonstrated the 
degree to which grassroots activism with respect to linked to 
inter-governmental pressures can produce dramatic societal 
changes.   13
Of course, it is notable, and a matter of controversy, that 
“human rights” in this activist transnational sense gave almost 
no attention to economic, social, and cultural rights. There have 
been recent attempts in both North and South to rectify this 
imbalance. The Center for Economic and Social Rights, founded 
by a group of young American law school graduates in the mid-
1990s, is an NGO explicitly dedicated to the implementation of 
these neglected international standards. Initiatives associated 
with opposition to certain aspects of economic globalization, 
including resistance to the imposition of structural adjustment 
programs and anti-debt coalitions, have moved toward a 
recognition that economic and social rights often are accorded 
primacy, and at least equivalance, in the life experience of 
economically disadvantaged countries seeking to cope with the 
poverty of a significant portion of their population. 
Recent problems associated with ethnic violence and 
encroachments on the survival of indigenous peoples have called 
attention to the importance of cultural rights. [See Maivan Clech 
Lam, At the Edge of the State (1999)] The terrorist attacks of   14
September 11
th, including their apparent fanatical expression of 
religious extremism, is a further dramatic indication of the 
relevance of cultural rights for the agendas of transnational 
activist networks. The concern takes on an urgency in this new 
global context giving a sudden priority to cultural rights as part 
of the struggle to avoid “the war against global terrorism” turning 
into “a clash of civilizations.” 
The emergence of such networks has evolved to the point 
where it is plausible to posit the emergence of “global civil 
society” as a constituency of networks committed in various 
ways to the promotion and attainment of global justice across a 
wide range of issues. The strength of this new dimension of 
world politics has been augmented by a flexible capacity to enter 
into collaborative relationships with governments in the pursuit 
of shared goals. The most successful expressions of this 
collaborative process to date are the Anti-Personnel Landmines 
Treaty and the Rome Treaty seeking the establishment of the 
ICC. But such collaboration has long been a formal and informal 
aspect of UN global conferences on such matters as   15
environmental protection, women, and the resources of the 
oceans. 
(5) The Anti-Colonial Movement. A momentous change in 
the climate of opinion accompanied the movement of 
decolonization, bringing into global policy arenas normative 
ideas about fairness and justice. As well, the legitimation of the 
struggle against colonialism rested on overwhelming UN support 
for the right of self-determination to be exercised by all colonized 
peoples (provided that there result no dismemberment of existing 
states).  
There are two relevant considerations. The first was the 
acceptance of a right of self-determination as a fundamental 
human right, which under favorable political circumstances at 
the end of the cold war was extended beyond the colonial setting 
to reinforce secessionist movements following the breakup of 
the Soviet Union and in relation to the disintegration of the 
former Yugoslavia. The second involved the participation in 
world politics of a large number of states with demands for   16
reform, especially in the economic and political spheres, raising 
questions about the nature of global justice. 
(6) Geopolitics of Ambivalence. In the 1990s there arose a 
new sense that the UN could act even with respect civil strife 
and breakdowns of internal order in response to impending or 
unfolding humanitarian catastrophes. The new phase of this 
process began in relation to famine and disease in Somalia in 
1992, generating both an active effort under the UN to alleviate 
the suffering and a subsequent set of state-rebuilding initiatives. 
These latter attempts produced a backlash that led to the death 
of 18 American peacekeeping soldiers in a firefight with forces in 
Somalia opposed to the political dimensions of the American 
presence. Such losses led to a reluctance by leading states to 
pay such costs for future undertakings that could not be 
explained and justified by governments from the perspective of 
strategic interests. This reluctance was magnified in response to 
genocide in Rwanda during 1994, with important UN members 
refusing to take even small steps to oppose the killing. [See 
Linda Malvern book] It also deeply altered the UN response to   17
ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, culminating in the massacres of some 
7,000 male Muslims at Srebrenica in 1995. [David Reiff, 
Slaughterhouse] Against this background, the UN was bypassed 
in the context of an impending humanitarian catastrophe in 
Kosovo, inducing “a coalition of the willing” to rely in 1999 on 
NATO to achieve effective protection for the increasing 
vulnerable and abused Albanian Kosovar majority population. 
Such a process attained effectiveness, but at the expense of 
legality, opening up an undesirable gap between what is 
permissible according to international law and what is morally 
and politically legitimate by reference to fundamental human 
rights, including the prohibition on ethnic cleansing. [See Report 
of Independent International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo 
Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned 
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001), esp. 163-98] 
The counter-intuitive point here is that this ambivalence in 
response to these extreme sets of circumstances produced some 
unexpected outcomes beneficial for the normative order. Such 
responses were meant partly to camouflage the unwillingness of   18
major states to take risks or pay the costs of an effective 
humanitarian intervention. The most important of these was the 
decision by the UN Security Council in 1993 to establish and fund 
ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the prosecution of 
severe crimes of state associated with the breakup of Yugoslavia 
and later, to deal with genocide in Rwanda. Such an initiative 
allowed the UN and its members to regain some of the high moral 
ground without making any controversial commitment to 
intervene directly. Geoffrey Robertson describes the climate of 
opinion that led to the establishment of the Yugoslav tribunal as 
“a fig leaf to cover the UN’s early reluctance to intervene in the 
Balkans.” [Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The 
Struggle for Global Justice (New York: New Press, 2001)xvii-
xviii.] Such a step also revived the Nuremberg idea in the post-
cold war setting, on the basis of a half-century of legal 
development with respect to international humanitarian law and 
in view of human rights law generally. This revival triggered 
further efforts in global civil society culminating in the 
establishment of an international criminal court, which has   19
restricted authority, but nevertheless represents a leap forward 
with regard to individual accountability for severe crimes of state 
and the extension of the rule of law in a manner that overrides 
earlier prerogatives of sovereignty. In this ironic regard, it is 
possible to conclude that in the 1990s this geopolitics of 
ambivalence led to a failure of the organized international 
community to protect several peoples exposed to extreme 
threats and harm, but also to make the perpetrators of such 
abuse more likely to be brought to justice in some form. The 
highest achievement to date in this respect is the indictment and 
apprehension of the former Yugoslavian head of state, Slobodon 
Milosevic. 
In effect, the reluctance of states to regard humanitarian 
goals as worthy of major sacrifices of lives or resources, while at 
the same time responding to pressures to put a moral face on 
foreign policy, has had strange and contradictory effects. Among 
these has been to lend support to civil society pressures to 
impose accountability on leaders for crimes of state and to 
institutionalize the process to the extent possible.   20
The September 11
th Attacks. The impacts of the mega-
terrorist attacks of September 11
th on the global context and its 
normative order is uncertain at this point, but it is likely to cause 
an eclipse, at least temporarily, of efforts to pursue transitional 
justice, and related preoccupations with global governance and 
the regulation of the world economy. The most immediate effect 
of mobilizing governments to engage in a war against global 
terrorism is to displace and redirect economic and normative 
concerns, and again allow security issues and geopolitical 
pragmatism to dominate the global policy agenda. Cooperative 
relations among governments to carry on “the global war against 
terrorism” necessarily leads to opportunistic diplomacy that 
overlooks instances of domestic oppression and human rights 
abuses in exchange for cooperation in pursuing “terrorists.” 
The analysis here suggests that the complexity and 
interconnectivity of world order as a result of technological 
innovations is likely to make this eclipse a temporary 
phenomenon. Such an anticipation is also reinforced by the 
extent to which transnational activism is likely to reassert its   21
demands for legitimate forms of global governance, which 
includes the extension of the rule of law and the 
institutionalization of procedures for accountability at national, 
regional, and global levels. Furthermore, there may even be 
unexpected outcomes, including a willingness by countries to 
participate in the establishment of accountability mechanisms 
and law enforcement procedures relating to terrorism in 
exchange for comparable commitments with respect to Crimes 
Against Humanity, genocide, and international humanitarian law. 
Without acknowledgement, there is likely to be a new 
resolve for reasons now of strategic self-interest of richer 
countries to address issues of poverty and development among 
the more economically distressed parts of the world. Such an 
outcome is not at all assured, as some counter-terrorist analysts 
have been quick to point out that there has been little or no 
global terrorism emanating from the most disadvantaged of all 
parts of the world, sub-Saharan Africa. The more persuasive 
approach to this issue is to note that under certain conditions 
widespread poverty, despair, humiliation gives rise to extremist   22
politics, and that such conditions have had such an effect in 
large portions of the Islamic world. 
II. Implementing Accountability Norms: Options and Mechanisms 
         As suggested, the global context created favorable and 
diverse conditions, especially starting in the 1990s, for the 
pursuit of transnational justice. This pursuit was not only 
directed toward the rectification of present grievances. It also 
focused, perhaps to a greater extent, on the redress of historic 
wrongs. This focus can be described as a multi-faceted 
worldwide phenomenon of responding to perceived examples of 
acute injustice inflicted on persecuted and victimized collective 
identities (race, religion, nationality, gender). [A useful overview 
of the range of restitution claims can be found in Elazar Barkan, 
The Moral Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historic 
Injustices (New York: Norton, 2000)] 
  In gaining an understanding of this pursuit of justice it is 
useful to consider both the substantive type of injustices that 
have give rise to the perceived grievance and the mechanism of 
rectification that is invoked in response. Finally, it will be helpful   23
to consider institutional and doctrinal developments intended to 
regularize the process by which victimized collectivities can be 
protected, either by their own initiative or through the operations 
of global law enforcement mechanisms. 
  There are several accounts of the emergence of this global 
justice movement that should be distinguished: (1) a series of 
stages that proceeds from the evolution of human rights`to their 
internationalization, and then further, a range of moves to 
promote their enforcement; [This line of interpretation is 
effectively presented by Robertson, note -] (2) the willingness of 
private sector actors (banks and corporations) and governments 
to acknowledge their responsibility to offer substantial 
compensation for past wrongs, what might be described as a 
restitution ethic; Barkan regards this path of restitution as “a 
potentially new international morality..a new globalism.” [Barkan, 
note -, ix]; (3) a more synthetic view of this dramatic heightening 
of global justice as drawing upon a rights discourse, a restitution 
and accountability ethos, and various impulses to stabilize and 
legitimize world order (either to soften criticism of corporate   24
globalization or, now, to ensure success in the war against global 
terrorism). This paper proceeds on the basis that this third view 
of transnational justice movement gives the best overall 
account. It should be noted that none of these overviews does a 
very convincing job of answering the question raised in the early 
part of this paper: why in the decade of the 1990s? why not 
earlier? And why the prediction now of a temporary eclipse? 
  The Role and Nature of Historic Injustices. The purpose 
here is to identify the most salient injustices that have been the 
source of initiatives designed to mitigate their bad memory and 
to give various forms of relief to victims and their 
representatives. Often, if not invariably, the dynamic of redress is 
pursued relentlessly by a particular community of victims, 
challenging the opposite dynamic of denial that is embraced 
often unwittingly by the wider societal community, and certainly 
by the perpetrators and their supporters. 
  ---the centrality of the Holocaust. Survivors of the 
Holocaust that occurred in Nazi Germany had been very active 
and effective since 1945 in efforts to secure various forms of   25
relief. The magnitude of the crimes committed particularly 
against the Jewish people in Europe exerted a formative impact 
on the entire post-World War II imagination, especially in 
combination with the guilt felt by the victorious liberal 
democracies of Western Europe and North America. Such an 
interaction to varying degrees was responsible for the 
Nuremberg Judgment, the criminalization of genocide by treaty, 
the internationalization of human rights, the global pursuit of 
Nazi era perpetrators of Nuremberg crimes, a variety of efforts to 
reverse the confiscation of Jewish property, and more 
controversially, the establishment of the state of Israel. In this 
regard, the Asian victims of Japanese injustice and exploitation 
from the World War II era received far less attention, with the 
Tokyo Trials of Japanese leaders accused of war crimes 
receiving scant attention at the time, and subsequently. It 
remains difficult to obtain the documentary record of the 
outcomes of these trials, and Japan was never placed under 
pressure comparable to Germany to renounce its past and 
restructure its future. As a result, Asian victims of injustice have   26
been far slower in the pursuit of their rights than were their 
European counterparts. The story is complex, the explanation of 
the salience of the Holocaust contested, but the importance of 
Holocaust-related efforts to rectify Nazi criminality cannot be 
doubted. 
  After the years immediately following World War II this 
activism associated with the victims of the Holocaust also was 
generally overtaken by the global preoccupations of the cold 
war. But there were exceptions, the most notable of which was 
the overseas abduction and subsequent 1961 trial and execution 
of Adolph Eichmann in Israel. By this undertaking Israel 
established the right of national courts to prosecute crimes 
against humanity wherever and whenever they occur, providing 
the foundation for what has later come to be known as “universal 
jurisdiction.” [There were other prosecutions under varying 
circumstances associated with punishing those associated with 
Holocaust crimes. For perceptive portrayal of this activity see 
Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of 
War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,   27
2000) esp. 174, suggesting that these post-Nuremberg trials were 
more effective in focusing on the Holocaust crimes, as 
Nuremberg had devoted its main attention to Crimes Against the 
Peace committed by the expansionism of Nazi regime.] 
  In the 1990s, however, the unfinished economic business of 
Holocaust claimants gained notoriety, achieving significant 
success in a number of areas: the recovery of so-called 
“Holocaust gold” and bank deposits from Swiss and other banks; 
the pursuit of proceeds from insurance policies issued on the 
lives of Holocaust victims, but never paid; the recovery of stolen 
art treasures; compensation for various categories of “slave 
labor” performed for the benefit of private corporations. Billions 
of dollars were transferred to victims and their representatives, 
either on an individual basis or through lump sum arrangements. 
Criticisms were voiced about the monetization of suffering, 
alleging even the emergence of “a Holocaust industry.” Also, 
lawyers were criticized for their large fees and many complaints 
were voiced about the differential success of various categories   28
of victims. Those from Eastern Europe fared less well, as did the 
non-Jewish victims of Naziism, especially the Roma. 
  Despite such criticisms, these moves toward redress did 
accomplish a number of results that are significant in relation to 
the overall pursuit of global justice: vindicating the rights of 
victims, even after the passage of years, to obtain economic 
redress for the violation of their property rights, including the 
right to receive compensation for work performed under abusive 
conditions; inspiring other non-Holocaust claimants to seek 
comparable forms of redress, especially those victim 
communities in the Pacific region. The pressures for redress in 
relation to the Holocaust ordeal were not solely, or perhaps 
predominantly, associated with the vindication of legal rights. 
Moral suasion and the reputation of governments and private 
sector actors were also important factors, suggesting both the 
emergence of a climate of opinion that supported claims by such 
victims and suggested adverse consequences for alleged 
wrongdoers that took legalistic refuge on matters of proof and 
formal right.   29
  ---Asia/Pacific Redress. There is no doubt that the 
Holocaust redress experience inspired efforts by a range of other 
victim communities, but especially on the part of those that 
arose out of the experience of Japanese expansionism before 
and during World War II. In part, such a delayed pursuit of redress 
in the 1990s was explicitly tied to the primacy of the Holocaust 
as in Iris Chang’s widely read book on the 1937 Nanking 
massacres entitled The Forgotten Holocaust. Aside from the 
psychological advantage of Eurocentrism and the sheer horror 
associated with Auschwitz, the Asian/Pacific context was less 
hospitable to moves toward redress: the Japanese government 
was far less repentant than the German government; a peace 
treaty with Japan had waived all individual claims, a legal 
obstacle that did not exist in the Holocaust setting; Japan had 
made certain “voluntary” payments to Asian countries, and were 
excused by treaty from further legal responsibility; there was 
less of an Asian tradition supporting individual claims or 
collective responsibility by governmental or private sector 
actors.   30
  Despite this, Asian/Pacific concerns with redress picked up 
considerably in the 1990s, but it placed far less emphasis, for 
reasons just indicated, on legal rights to obtain economic 
restitution. It concentrated more on exerting an influence on 
public opinion, achieving symbolic satisfaction in informal arenas 
where past criminality could be confirmed and by soliciting 
formal acknowledgement and repudiation, especially by the 
Japanese Government. With respect to war crimes in the 
countries occupied by Japan, public and academic meetings, 
often with the Japanese participants, reconstructed the 
criminality alleged to have occurred. In effect, redress was 
sought by the activation of memory, and through its validation by 
responsible governmental leaders. 
  Global civil society also contributed, especially in the form 
of participating in the organization and conduct of “citizens’ 
tribunals” that confirmed allegations and reached conclusions, 
which included recommendations. The Japanese wartime 
practice of “sexual slavery” and “comfort women” was made the 
subject of a highly publicized proceeding in Japan. [See Christine   31
M. Chinken, “Women’s International Tribunal on Japanese 
Military Sexual Slavery,” American Journal of International Law 
95: 335-41 (2001)] 
  In recent years more direct legal efforts to recover some 
form of compensation on behalf of various groups of victims, 
including those abused as prisoners of war by being made to 
engage in forced labor that benefited private firms and the 
Japanese war effort, have not succeeded for reasons earlier 
suggested. At the same time, the presentation of such claims 
and associated publicity has greatly heightened awareness of 
such abusive patterns, which itself seems to have a beneficial 
effect on the healing process even after a lapse of decades. 
  ---Redress for Indigenous Peoples. Representatives of 
indigenous peoples have for the past thirty years or so made 
various efforts to internationalize their struggle to protect the 
remnants of their traditional prerogatives with respect to land, 
resources, and ways of life. There is great diversity of 
perspective and strategy, but a consensus as to a broad array of 
normative demands set forth in the Declaration of the Rights of   32
Indigenous Peoples, and centered on a contested claim of a right 
of self-determination. The UN has provided a space for the 
articulation of this consensus in the form of the Informal Working 
Group on the Rights of Indigenous Populations that met annually 
for several weeks in Geneva under the auspices of the 
Committee Against all Forms of Discrimination and Persecution. 
  The redress being sought was diverse, but mainly future-
oriented in the sense of seeking to protect what remained of the 
patrimony of indigenous peoples against the assaults associated 
with large-scale modernizing development projects. There was a 
widespread recognition by governments and by the United 
Nations that the grievances of indigenous peoples were founded 
on historic injustices of dramatic proportions, and that some 
level of response should be encouraged. But what level? Any 
attempt to rectify past wrongs seemed outside the bounds of 
political feasibility, and so the focus shifted to preserving the 
status quo in the face of continuing assaults.    
  ---Reparations for Slavery. In recent years there have 
been more and more serious efforts by descendants of slaves in   33
America to seek reparations for the suffering associated with 
their bondage. Prior to the 1990s, such contentions had been 
dismissed as frivolous, or divisive, but the successful pursuit of 
Holocaust claims, especially those related to slave labor, lent an 
aura of credibility to the contention that the victims of slavery, or 
at least their heirs, should be compensated to some extent.  
The UN Conference on Racism, held during 2001 in Durban, 
acknowledged that slavery and the international slave trade, 
were crimes against humanity “and should always have been so.” 
The Final Declaration stops short of supporting reparations, and 
puts its emphasis on states “to honor the memory of the victims” 
and to call for the universal condemnation of slavery and its 
“reoccurrence prevented.” 
     ---Political Crimes of State. The idea that even political 
leaders can be held accountable under international legal 
standards for crimes against their own citizenry was given its 
historic impetus at Nuremberg. Such accountability overrode 
idea about sovereign immunity, acts of state, and the territorial 
character of criminal law. After World War II such standards of   34
accountability were imposed on surviving leaders of Germany 
and Japan, but the notion of accountability was associated with 
wartime, and was applied in such a way as to give weight to 
allegations of “victors’ justice.” [The best analysis along these 
lines was directed at the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal in Richard 
Minear, Victors’ Justice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 19 ); the most respective positive appraisal in the context 
of the German trials was made by a member of the US team of 
prosecutors. Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg 
Trials (New York: Knopf, 199-).] Despite these criticisms, the 
imposition of accountability was based on trials in which the 
defendant was given due process. Those convicted and punished 
were clearly responsible for waging “aggressive war” and 
implicated in practices that were grossly inhumane.  
At the same time, the governments that had organized 
these trials, and constructed world order after 1945, were not 
ready to institutionalize what had been an ad hoc and flawed 
approach to accountability. The Nuremberg Principles were 
formulated in an authoritative form by the International Law   35
Commission, and then endorsed by way of a UN General 
Assembly Resolution. In this sense, a normative framework for 
accountability was incorporated into international customary 
law, and binding on all states. But no institutional 
implementation was undertaken until after the cold war. 
To the extent that the Nuremberg idea of accountability 
was kept alive during the cold war era, it was a result of activist 
individuals in civil society, and particularly in the United States 
during the latter stages of the Vietnam War. In this period various 
acts of non-cooperation with government policy, whether 
refusing to serve in the armed forces, pay taxes, and other forms 
of resistance, relied for justification on the existence of “a 
Nuremberg obligation.” Individuals were obliged to obey 
international law, not their own government, with respect to 
fundamental issues relating to recourse to war and its conduct. 
Notions of accountability resurfaced with a flourish during 
the 1990s. First of all, there were international trials before the 
Hague Tribunal of individuals arising out of alleged crimes 
committed in the course of the Balkan Wars. And second, there   36
was the spectacular Spanish indictment and British detention of 
General Augusto Pinochet for crimes committed during his 
tenure as head of state in Chile during the period 1976-89. This 
incident encouraged wider scrutiny that extended to such 
controversial figures as Henry Kissinger and Ariel Sharon. It also 
stimulated efforts to provide a more authoritative framework to 
guide national courts when asked to impose accountability on 
persons alleged to be responsible for past crimes of state. [See 
collaborative effort of international law experts resulting in The 
Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, brochure 
published under the auspices of the Program in Law and Public 
Affairs, Princeton University, 2001.] 
 
II.  Modalities of Response 
         As Martha Minow has observed, “..a century marked by 
human slaughter and torture, sadly, is not a unique century in 
human history. Perhaps more unusual than the facts of genocides 
and regimes of torture marking this era is the invention of new 
and distinctive legal forms of response.” [Minow, Between   37
Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and 
Mass Violence (Boston, MA: Beacon, 1998) 1.] We need to 
underscore this realization that the departure from history is not 
the occurrence of unspeakable mass crimes against people, but 
the growing resolve to treat such behavior as ruptures of the 
normative order of world society that needs to be formally 
repudiated. The essence of this repudiation is to rely on legal 
mechanisms to render “justice,” to avoid endorsing retaliatory 
violence, and to seek an eventual reconciliation through a 
compbination of transparency (that is, documenting the evil) and 
retribution (that is, punishing the perpetrators via a fair 
procedure). As argued this process gained momentum after the 
end of the cold war, but now is placed in some jeopardy by the 
events of September 11
th. This section reviews briefly the main 
lines of response that have been adopted to fit a wide range of 
national and global contexts.  
  If the focus here is upon transnational justice, then should 
the role of national institutions in addressing past instances of 
injustice be included? Given the interpenetration of national and   38
global, the distinction has become artificial in the extreme for 
many, but not all, purposes. Here, the initiation of some 
procedure at least to document past criminality has become part 
of the rehabilitation process, signifying a rupture with the past, 
which restores full legitimacy to a government. But also, there is 
an interactive dynamic working in both directions. The judicial 
scrutiny of Pinochet in Spanish and, especially, in British courts, 
appeared to create a new receptivity in Chile, after Pinochet was 
returned due to the British finding that he was not medically fit 
to stand trial. And the truth and reconciliation process that 
became so widespread for the past two decades as an integral 
feature of transitions to democracy at the state level, 
undoubtedly contributed to the willingness of many governments 
to support the idea of an international criminal court. The statute 
of such a court, as embodied in the Rome Treaty, recognized the 
complementarity of national and international tribunals, giving 
priority to national prosecution. 
    ---criminal trials: national and international. There is 
no more dramatic instance of moves toward transnational justice   39
than the indictment and prosecution of those responsible for the 
perpetration of unforgivable crimes, especially heads of state. 
This revival of the Nuremberg idea of accountability for violating 
fundamental international (and national) norms represents part of 
a wider process of seeking to limit sovereign discretion, and to 
establish “responsible sovereignty” as a condition of membership 
in good standing of a state in international society. Thus 
allegations and indictments directed at Pinochet and Milosevic 
have received media attention and are of great public interest. 
  Beyond this, the trial of perpetrators of such international 
crimes, even if belatedly, achieves a form of retributive justice. 
Although the punishment can rarely fit the crime, given its 
character, it helps with the healing of victims and their families. 
Such trials also generate a documentary record of criminality 
that contributes to an ethos of prevention with respect to the 
future. 
  Of course, there are problematic aspects, as well. The 
International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia has been 
criticized as “politically” motivated. The indictment of Milosevic   40
in the midst of a NATO attack on his country is often mentioned 
in this regard. If not indicted in relation to the Bosnian War where 
more severe instances of ethnic cleansing occurred, why for his 
conduct in Kosovo? If only his crimes in Kosovo could be 
established by available evidence, why not wait until the military 
campaign had ended? Other criticisms related to the failure to 
give as much attention to Croatian and Bosniac crimes as to 
Serbian crimes, the slowness of the process, and the lightness of 
some of the sentences given the gravity of the allegations in an 
indictment. 
  The use of national courts to prosecute international 
crimes committed by non-national government or military 
officials invoking principles of universal jurisdiction is also 
controversial. The discussion of such judicial activism has been 
stimulated by a Belgian law that allows prosecution of crimes 
against humanity wherever committed. This has prompted civil 
society groups to seek indictments against such figures as Henry 
Kissinger and Ariel Sharon. It has also raised questions as to 
whether international society is ready for such attempts to   41
impose accountability. Criticism centers on practicality and the 
unevenness of international society. In a world of states, such 
impositions of law disrupt diplomacy in some instances, and if 
applied widely to current leaders, would likely generate acute 
international tension. There exist wide disparities as to what 
constitutes criminality, especially when a government uses 
violence to deal with radical movements of self-determination. 
The processes of transnational justice have not yet attained a 
level where equals can be treated equally. Hence, it is an 
imperfect justice, but still an advance over widespread 
circumstances of "im“unity." 
  Whether most leading states will decide to become parties 
to the International Criminal Court once it is established, remains 
questionable. There has been some speculation that the 
cooperative law process associated with the global war against 
terrorism, is likely to convince governments of the importance of 
an international criminal tribunal, and may lead to the 
establishment of a new tribunal with authority to deal only with 
terrorism as an international crime. Past efforts to include   42
terrorism among indictable international crimes by an 
international tribunal have foundered due to a lack of consensus 
as to how “terrorism” should be defined, and whether capital 
punishment should be imposed. Such obstacles do not exist at a 
national level where states legislate their own definitions of 
terrorism.   
 ---civil  litigation  and economic reparations. Domestic 
legislation in several countries, especially in the federal units 
that constitute the United States, have facilitated class actions 
for Holocaust-related economic claims arising from past 
confiscations and thefts of property, slave labor, non-
performance of economic duties. Large payments in the billions 
of dollars have resulted, although due to high legal fees and the 
large number of claimants, recovery on a per capita basis is still 
of mainly nominal and symbolic value. The compensation 
received makes no pretense of full restitution for the losses 
endured.  
  Similar initiatives deal with the economic dimensions of 
Japan’s abuses of fundamental property rights have not up to   43
now succeeded. In part, this is due to the lesser leverage of the 
claimants, but it is also a result of the treaty waiver of private 
claims, and the continuing support given to this legal defense in 
American courts by the US Government in relation to the 
obligations of the Japanese government and Japanese 
corporations (accused of using slave labor throughout the 
Pacific).  
  American courts have also been used to obtain 
compensation in “wrongful death” Federal litigation that is based 
on loss of life resulting from the commission of international 
crimes. In the celebrated Filartiga case, an American plaintiff 
was allowed to recover damages for torture endured in Paraguay 
on the theory that torture was an international crime. 
  In essence, national courts have been increasingly used to 
address injustices of the sort that result from crimes against 
humanity and torture by way of awarding some compensation or 
restitution to victims and their representatives. Such a role for 
courts is definitely contributing to the pursuit of transnational 
justice.   44
  ---truth  and  reconciliation  commissions. As earlier 
discussed, under certain circumstances of peaceful transition to 
democracy, the criminality of the prior regime, cannot be 
addressed in a retributive manner for a variety of political 
reasons. In these settings, the impulse to repudiate the past, to 
heal the wounds of victims and their families, and to pledge 
respect for rights in the future, recourse to a truth and 
reconciliation procedure provides the most satisfactory and 
effective mechanism. The parameters of a particular commission 
are negotiated, reflecting the play of forces in each setting, and 
in some instances, it is possible that criminal prosecutions may 
complement the truth and reconciliation procedure. As in the 
South African instance, where amnesty was conditional on a full 
disclosure of past conduct, the ideas of truth and reconciliation 
are directly related to retributive justice. Depending on the 
particular arrangement, perpetrators may be named, as in the 
case of El Salvador, or merely the offenses described, as in the 
case of Chile.   45
  ---humanitarian  diplomacy. In the 1990s one of the 
most important initiatives to protect abused or suffering peoples 
involved international undertakings of an interventionary 
character, preferably under UN auspices. Generally discussed 
under the rubric of “humanitarian intervention,” such actions, if 
involving military force and a mandate to engage in state-
building, were and remain controversial. The main lines of 
objection were associated with legal arguments based on the UN 
Charter precluding interventions in matters “essentially within 
domestic jurisdiction.” (Article 2(7)). The fundamental issue here 
is the balance between international accountability for 
wrongdoing and sovereign rights to exercise territorial 
supremacy. Efforts have been made to develop a principled 
framework by which to strike a balance between these two 
ordering ideas: implementing international standards to prevent 
humanitarian catastrophe and respect for territorial sovereignty. 
[See Kosovo Report, note --, 191-98; for an excellent overview 
see Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2000?)]     46
  The contested practice of humanitarian intervention with 
and without UN authorization seemed a central issue in the 
1990s. The controversy and mixed results of the Kosovo War, 
together with the shift in priorities after September 11
th, make 
the future prospect of humanitarian intervention seem rather 
remote. At the same time, the global climate could change 
rapidly in the face of severe instances of suffering, and public 
pressures mounted to intervene. The blurred 
domestic/international boundary makes it likely that the 
challenge of humanitarian intervention, although pushed now 
toward the background, will reemerge in the years ahead. 
 
III.  A Concluding Note 
The pursuit of transnational justice was vastly accelerated 
in the 1990s, but is likely to be sidelined in the early part of the 
21
st century as a result of the new preoccupation with global 
terrorism. At the same time, the momentum that underlies the 
development of international human rights and accountability 
movements is likely to be sustained even in this period by   47
transnational social forces operating within global civil society. 
The move from normative architecture (framing rights and duties) 
to implementation and enforcement seems irreversible. In this 
sense, institutional innovations together with public opinion are 
likely to keep the agenda of transnational justice alive despite 
the shift in geopolitical mood. And even this shift may have 
unanticipated consequences, such as creating a more effective 
framework for combating transnational crime, including 
terrorism. 